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RECONCEIVING REPARATIONS: MULTIPLE 
STRATEGIES IN THE REPARATIONS 
DEBATE 
ERIC]' MILLER* 
Abstract: Much of the current debate oyer Mrican-American reparations 
is characterized by a posture of confrontation and demand, and is 
exemplified in the law by seeking redress using the doctrines of tort and 
unjust enrichment. This confrontational posture presents a variety of 
legal, political. and ethical problems for reparations advocates, and has 
alienated potential allies from the reparations moyement. This Article 
examines and exposes the confrontation model's shortcomings, 
proposing as an alternative a "conversational" model for reparations 
debate and advocacy. The conversational framework is not only a superior 
litigation strategy that more closely approximates traditional civil rights 
litigation, it also embraces the complexity of the current debate on race, 
premitting the nation to engage in a more inclusive discussion of the 
future of race in America. 
{Njothing is more freighted with meaning for our OWlI destiny than the revolu-
tion of the Negro A.lIlerican. III far too many ways Amelican Negroes have been 
G1lOtlw' nation: de/lrived of freedom, crip/lled by hatred, the doors of opportunity 
closed to hope. In our time change has come to this Nation, too. The Amelican 
Negro, acting with impressive restraint, has peacefully protested and marched, 
entered the courtrooms and the scats of goVel'll/llellt, demanding a justice that 
has long been denied. The voice of the Negro was the call to action. But it is a 
tribute to A.lIlcnca that, once aroused, the courts and the Congress, the President 
and 11I0st of the people, have been the allies of progress. 1 
INTRODUCTION 
At the heart of the reparations debate are the issues of account-
ing and reckoning: the first seeks to trace our mutual obligations to 
* Assistant Professor, Western New England College School of Law. Thanks to Zachary 
Fulz, Adriaan Lanni, Natasha Williams. Alfred L. Brophy. Kenneth Mack. and Charles J. 
Ogletree. Jr. for their comments and encouragement during the writing of this paper. I 
also owe a special debt to Professor Randall Kennedy, whose supportive and thoughtful 
comments have deeply influenced my thinking on reparations. 
1 President Lyndon B. Johnson. To Fulfill These Rights. Commencement Address at 
Howard University (june 4. 1965). at http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/ciyilrights/S060465.htm. 
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each other as fellow citizens and fellow humans; the second attempts 
to determine how we are to act upon these obligations. The "reckon-
ing" strand of reparations has a broad sweep: it implicates the issue of 
how we are to participate in our national life together, particularly 
through our national institutions. Put simply, reparations arguments 
demand that we account for and acknowledge the fact that our na-
tion's institutions were founded upon discrimination. So understood, 
reparations does not predetermine what such acknowledgement re-
quires, but recognizes that it will vary with each accounting for the 
wrong done. In this way, reparations is conceived of as a means of en-
gaging in a national dialogue about race that is not limited to 
"preaching to the choir" but attempts to engage with the complexity 
of racial interrelation in modern America. 
Popularly, arguments for reparations for African Americans are 
characterized by two related features: confrontation and demand. 
Confrontational reparations arguments are exemplified by the rally-
ing cry of the Millions for Reparations March in Washington D.C. last 
year: "They owe US."2 Such arguments are generally regarded as tied 
to a demand for monetary payments from whites to blacks for wrongs 
suffered as a result of slavery. As a result, reparations has been charac-
terized as a racist, divisiye attack on white America, where blacks-as-
victims attempt to create a nation within a nation in hopes of a payout 
for wrongs inflicted over a cen tury-and-a-half ago. 3 
The current confrontational posture of many reparations advo-
cates and litigators is, therefore, deeply problematic. Presented purely 
as confrontation, reparations suffers from disabling political and ethi-
cal problems and alienates large numbers of potential allies, includ-
ing liberals and members of the black community.4 As manifested in a 
2 Chris L. Jenkins & Hamil R. Harris, Descendants of Slaves Rally for Repamtions: Organiz-
ers Cal/Event Milestone in lIIovement, WASil. POST, Aug. 18,2002, at Cl. 
3 See, e.g., David Horowitz, Ten Reasons Why Reparations for Blacks is a Bad Idea for Blacks -
and Racist. Too! (Mar. 12, 2001) (controversial anti-reparations advertisement), at http:/ / 
www.adyersity.net/reparations/anti_repations_ad.htm. 
4 For example, a recent study showed that while 79% of blacks supported a govern-
mental apology to African Americans, only 20% of whites did. Harbour Fraser Hodder, 
Riven by Reparations: The Price of Slavery, HARv. MAG., May/June 2003, at 12, 13. When it 
comes to monetary reparations to slave descendants, two-thirds of blacks fayored the idea, 
against a mere 4% of whites, demonstrating a 63-point "racial gulf." Id. 
"These numbers are relatively shocking by any standard," says Michael Daw-
son [author of the study]. "When we talk about gender gaps in American 
politics, we're talking about gaps of 5 to 15 percent. Here we're talking about 
gaps of the order of 50 to more than 60 percent." Deeply polarized percep-
tions of racial equality (or its lack) are a major factor underlying the over-
2004] Reconceiving Reparations 47 
legal strategy, the politics of confrontation is centered upon a vague 
and poorly conceptualized notion of tort or unjust enrichment. 
Part I of this Article illustrates the manner in which the confronta-
tion model has been recast in legal terms variously under theories of 
tort or unjust enrichment. Both types of theory attempt to develop a 
vision of corrective justice, with the tort theories focused on the wrong 
done to the victim and unjust enrichment concerned with the benefit 
accruing to the perpetrator of the wrong.5 Part II demonstrates the 
ways in which recent political and legal initiatives exposed the short-
comings of confrontationist strategy and developed other avenues of 
relief. Parts III and IV suggest that these alternate, multiple, political 
and legal strategies point to a moral and legal case for reparations that 
does not minimize or simplifY, but embraces, the complexity of race 
relations in America. Instead of a sectional demand for a group or indi-
vidual right to restitution, reparations requires us to explore the fact of 
hurt and rejection and to develop strategies to restore and repair the 
damage done, in partnership, as a nation. 
Ultimately, confrontation has its place: it is a legitimate response 
to a particular form of rejection. But if confrontation is taken as the 
whole of reparations, we will lose the potential for racial reconcilia-
tion that should be at the heart of the reparations movement. 
Id. 
whelming disparities. ''''bile a majority of white respondents (64 percent) 
thought that blacks had achieved or would soon achieve equality, an even 
larger majority (78 percent) of blacks believed the opposite: that Mrican 
Americans would not achieve racial equality in their lifetimes, or that they 
would never achieve equality. 
5 See Rhonda V. Magee, The Alaster's Tools, fivm the Bottom Up: Responses to African-
American Reparations Theory in .!I1ainstream and Outsider Remedies Discourse. 79 VA. L. REV. 863, 
914 (1993) ("More so than any other remedial tradition, reparations resonate with the 
traditional theory of correcth'e justice by which the scope of the violation dictates the 
scope of the remedy, and by which compensation is granted for unjust enrichment."); see 
also l\1ari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 373-97 (1987) (offering classic discussion of the tort model); KIM 
FORDE-MAZRUI, TAKING THE RIGHT SERIOUSLY: AMERICA's MORAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
EFFECTS OF PAST RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 26-27 (SOc. Sci. Network Elec. Paper Collection, 
Working Paper No. 02-1, 2002) (suggesting unjust enrichment as another reason "why 
society might choose to ameliorate conditions disproportionately suffered by black Ameri-
cans"), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/ delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID311860_code02061 
3630.pdf?abstatid=311860. Matsuda also considers unjust enrichment as an appropriate 
means of analyzing the duty owed to minority groups claiming reparations. Matsuda, supra, 
at 380 & 3.3(d) n.231. 
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I. CONFRONTATIONAL REPARATIONS 
Popularly, reparations for African Americans are characterized by 
a posture of confrontation between the descendants of slaves and the 
whites ,vho have benefited from slavery. Legal theories of tort or un-
just enrichment do not challenge this "confrontational" model but 
give it legal expression. Unfortunately, the confrontational model 
embodies a rather narrow technique for obtaining redress and, as I 
suggest, that shortcoming may infect the legal strategy as well. 
Reparations claims that follow the confrontational model tend to 
focus on one wrong-chattel slavery-and attempt to come up with 
more or less innovative and more or less legally sound ways to gain 
some kind of monetary payment for the wrong. 6 Innovation, however, 
has generally centered around developing tort or quasi-contractual 
theories to explain the duty owed by whites to blacks for the wrong of 
slavery. Such theories generally attempt to address the rights and duties 
implicated in reparations claims through the standard, bilateral model 
of individual or group rights, in which the rights of one individual or 
group are pitted against another. In that individual-rights or group-
rights model, the point is simply to identity who bears the rights and 
what their relative strength is. In law, the problem can be expressed in 
terms of "correlativity" or the "bilateral logic of private law."7 On this 
6 See generally RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS (2000); 
Anthony Gifford, The LegaL Basis of the Claim for Slavery Reparations, HUM, RTS, MAG., Spring 
2000, at 16; Art Alcausin Hall, There Is a Lot to Be Repaired Before lIe Get to Reparations: A. C,i-
tique of the Underlying Issues of Race that Impact the Fate of A.fiican American Reparations, 2 
SCHOLAR 1 (2000); Kevin Hopkins, Forgive US. Our Debts? Rightillg the Wrongs of SlavelY, 89 
GEO. LJ. 2531 (2001); Donald Aquinas Lancaster, Jr., The :Ucl/ellly and Legacy of the United 
States of America's Sanction of Slavery and Segregation: .'l. Property Law and Equitable Remedy 
Analysis of Afiican American Rejmrations, 43 How. LJ. 171 (2000); Jeremy Levitt, Black Afri-
can Reparations: /VIakillg a Claim for Enslavement and Systematic De jure Segregation {(nd Racial 
Discrimination Under American International Law, 25 S. U. L. REV. 1 (1997); Vincene Verdun, 
If the Shoe Fits, Hear It: An Analysis of Reparations to African Americans, 67 TUL. L. REV. 597 
(1993); Robert Westley, /VIany Billio1/s GOlle: Is It Time to Reconsider the Case for Black Repara-
tions?, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 429 (1998); Eric K. \;unamoto, Racial Reparations: japanese 
ibne/iean Redress and Afiieall ,'l.lIlelJean Claims, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 477 (1998) [here-
inafter \amamoto, Racial Reparations]; Rhonda V. Magee, Note, The Master's Tools, From the 
Bottom Up: Responses to African-American Reparations Theory in Alainstremll and Outsider Reme-
dies Discourse, 79 VA. L. REV. 863 (1993). A notable exception to this trend is one of the 
earliest modern legal arguments (mostly) supporting reparations. See BORIS I. BrnKER, 
THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (First Beacon Press 2003) (1973). 
7 Emma Coleman Jordan, A History Lesson: Reparations for What?, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
Al-I. L. 557, 558 (2003) (quoting HANOCH DAGAN, THE FOURTH PILLAR: THE LAW & ETIl-
ICS OF RESTITUTION (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript of Chapter 7 at 8»). 
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model, whosoever has the stronger right-to compensation or to be let 
alone-in a given instance, wins.8 
For example, Professor Matsuda, in an early and influential dis-
cussion of reparations, recasts the bilateral relations between individ-
ual perpetrators and defendants in terms of group rights.9 In chal-
lenging the "rigid" "penchant for ... close and ordered relations 
between individual disputants,"l0 Matsuda suggests that a broader no-
tion of group harm can be imposed upon tort law doctrine to enable 
reparations claims to proceed through the court system. l1 
In another early article, Professor Verdun echoes Matsuda's analy-
sis. Verdun suggests that reparations advocates would identify the con-
tinuing and uncompensated wrong to the community as the "failure to 
pay for slave labor and the contribution of slaves to the building of this 
country."12 Accordingly, reparations advocates would identity the in-
jured party as all African Americans and the wrongdoer as society. On 
the one hand, society is doing well and continues to reap the benefits 
of slave labor. On the other hand, "the injured party is still injured and 
suffers from the consequences of the wrong. "13 Thus, reparations advo-
cates would require the entire community to take responsibility for cor-
recting the wrong. 14 
For the purposes of a reparations claim based on the confronta-
tional model of individuals or group rights, these claims can be repre-
8 Often, this discussion of moral or legal conflict is phrased in terms of "balancing." 
[Bjalancing ... continues to be seductive ... because it fits our usual concep-
tions and metaphors of justice, fairness, and reasonableness. Justice holds 
scales in her hands. We "weigh" the evidence to determine which party pre-
vails. In reaching difficult personal decisions, we list the "pros" and ·cons." 
Policy makers undertake cost-benefit analyses when choosing among alterna-
tive courses of action. Balancing provides a careful, sensitive, thoughtful way 
to dispense justice, to give each his or her due. By gently urging us to con-
sider all the relevant factors, it fosters serenity and confidence. It is the mark 
ofa reasonable, rational, subtle mind. 
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE LJ. 943, 962 
(1987); see also Patrick M. McFadden, The Balancing Test, 29 B.C. L. REV. 585, 596 (1988) 
(identifying three steps to any balancing test: "announcing the factors to be balanced, 
weighing those factors. and announcing the victor"). 
9 See Matsuda, supra note 5, at 375 (suggesting that a reparations claim is a typical indi-
vidual rights claim recast as a group rights claim). 
10 [d. at 374. 
11 See id. at 373-80. 
12 Verdun. supra note 6, at 63l. 
13 [d. at 639. 
B [d. at 63l. 
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sented with equal fidelity as depending upon theories of tortl5 or un-
just enrichment.16 Under either theory, the wrong is constituted by 
the institution of slavery and the demand is to be made whole for its 
continuing effects (which may include Jim Crow) P Reparations, on 
this account, involves a demand for restoration of the ill-gotten gains 
of slavery to the group that was wronged.IS In so doing, it suggests 
both a legal strategy and an emotionally compelling moral argument. 
The legal strategy requires us to identify the various ways that blacks 
were harmed by whites who profited from slavery and then to sue for 
the repayment of those profits either to individuals or into some cen-
15 A tort is "a civil wrong for which a remedy may be obtained, usually in the form of 
damages." 74 N.I.JUR. 2D TOTts § 1 (2003). l\btsuda, for example, believes that tort theo-
ries of reparations partake of the bilateral logic described. See Jordan, supm note 7, at 558; 
Matsuda, supm note 5, at 375. Reparations, however, may be expressed as an objective duty 
founded in respect for the rights of victims of injurious actions. See D.N. MacCormick, The 
Obligation of Repamtion, 78 PROC. ARISTOELlAN Soc 'y 175, 183-89 (1978). Interestingly, this 
definition of reparations permits a tort theory of reparations that steers clear of standard 
theories as to the correlativity of rights and duties that are implicit in the confrontation 
model. See id. at 185. 
16 "Unjust enrichment is defined as the unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of an-
other, or the retention of money or property of another against the fundamental princi-
ples of justice or equity and good conscience." 66 AM. JUR. 2D Restitution and Implied Con-
tmcts § 9 (2002). 
It is a general principle, underlying various legal doctrines and remedies, that 
one person should not be permitted unjustly to enrich himself at the expense 
of another, but should be required to make restitution of or for property or 
benefits received, retained, or appropriated, where it isjust and equitable that 
such restitution be made, and where such action involves no violation or frus-
tration of law or opposition to public policy, either directly or indirectly. 
Id. at§ 8. 
17 See, e.g., ROBINSON, supm note 6, at 16 (arguing that America can not be whole "un-
til all Americans .... are repaired in their views of Africa's role in history"). One way to 
distinguish between the tort and unjust enrichment theories is to suggest that tort law is a 
form of "corrective justice" that compensates the victim by assessing the magnitude of the 
loss suffered, whereas unjust enrichment attempts to determine damages by measuring the 
gain accruing to the perpetrator. See FORDE-MAZURI, supm note 5, at 27 n.l00. Tort law 
requires compensation for an injury inflicted. It entails that one group-white Ameri-
cans-injured another group-African American slaves. See Matsuda, supm note 5, at 
380-84 (discussing causation, forseeability, and deterrence in reparations claims). The 
theory of unjust enrichment entails, first, that one group-in this case, generally, though 
not limited to, white Americans-has profited (and continues to profit) at the expense of 
another group-African Americans-and that such profit was wrongful. See 66 N.1. JUR. 2D 
Restitution and Implied Contmcts §§ 8-9 (2002). 
18 The difference between the two theories lies primarily in the measurement of dam-
ages. Under a tort theory, the measure of damages is the injury suffered. Under an unjust 
enrichment theory, the measure of damages are the benefits accruing to the perpetrator. 
The damages awarded under the unjust enrichment theory may amount to more, less, or 
the same as under a tort theory. See FORDE-MAZRUI, supm note 5, at 27 n.100. 
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tral fund for more general disbursement. 19 The moral argument as-
serts that whites as a group were, and continue to be, responsible for 
the ills of the African American community.20 
It is the power and simplicity of that moral claim that makes 
reparations at once so compelling an argument and so difficult for 
the vast majority of whites to endorse. 21 That power has ensured that 
the politics of confrontation has been a central feature of much repa-
rations activism. For example, in 1969, James Forman made one of 
the most famoHs demands for reparations, interrupting the morning 
senice at New York's (mostly white) Riverside Church to deliver his 
Black Jvlanifesto demanding reparations for African Americans. 22 For-
man's confrontational tactics reappear in the rhetoric of "[ t] hey owe 
us," which was the rallying call for the Millions for Reparations March 
in Washington, D.C. last year. 23 Drawing explicitly on the confronta-
tional structure of the tort and unjust enrichment models, this rheto-
ric constitutes the reparations debate as a conflict between two rights-
bearers, each attempting to demonstrate that his/her rights trump 
those of the other.24 Put differently, this debate replicates the tradi-
tional, indhidualistic structure of rights arguments in which individu-
als compete against each other, African AJllericans asserting a claim-
right to certain property, and white (and other) A.mericans asserting a 
liberty-right not to have their property seized.25 
19 Sec, e.g .• Ewart Guinier, Book Review, 82 YALE LJ. 1719, 1722 (1973) (arguing that 
broad reparations legislatolll \\iill "transcend the difficulties" of llHlividual administration 
of reparations); Charles]. Ogletree, Jr., Litigating the Legacy of Slavery, N.Y. TIMES. Mar. 31, 
2002, § 4, at 9 (discusslllg possibilities for the distribution of reparations on a national 
level); Charles]. Ogletree,Jr. 8: E.R. Shipp, Docs AIIICI7crt Owe Us?, ESSENCE, Feb. 2003, at 
128 (citing a recent example of reparations paid to black farmers). 
20 Sec John Hope Franklin, Letter: Horowitz:S Diatribe Contains Historical Inaccuracies (Mar. 
30, 2001), amilable at http://squawk.ca/lbo-talk/0I03/2289.html. 
21 Sec Hodder, sujJra, note 4, at 13 (citing statistical evidence to demonstrate that most 
people do not endorse reparations). 
22 See BITTKER, supra note 6, at 4-5, app. at 159-75. Forman's main demands included 
the establishment ofa black land bank; four major publishing and printing llldustries; four 
tele"ision networks; a research center; a training center; a welfare rights organization; a 
labor strike and defense fund; a pan-African busllless cooperative; and a black university. 
Sec James Foreman, Black .Manifesto, Address Before the Riverside Church of New york 
City (I\Iay4, 1969), ill BrrTKER, sujJl"anote 6, app. at 159-75. 
23 SeeJenkins 8: Harris, supra note 2, at C2. 
24 Sec generally JOliN FINN IS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1982) (arguing that 
natural law prm'ides the criteria for evaluating the institutions that secure its benefits). 
25 Sec, e.g., \\'ESI.EY NEWCOMB HOIIFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS Ap-
PLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING 36-39 ('''alter Wheeler Cook ed., 1964) (1919) (defining 
rights and duties, privileges and "no rights"). 
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Part of the problem presented by the confrontational reparations 
claim is that it is over-inclusive and so fails to provide a satisfactory 
theory of compensation. The familiar argument is that it identifies 
too many white people as owing a duty to repay-as injuring or 
wrongfully enriching themselves at the expense of African Ameri-
cans-and too many Mrican Americans as having suffered the harm.26 
Many, perhaps most, of the white people in America are not de-
scended from slave owners and many white people's ancestors arrived 
on these shores after the end of slavery or Jim CroW.27 Furthermore, 
there are now many more people of Mrican descen t in America than 
there are those descended from American slaves, and a significant 
subset of them are not descended from slaves but from free Africans. 28 
And the solution-a one-time payment to particular African Ameri-
cans or to a group-does not seem to be able to right the wrong com-
plained of. Such payments run the risk of failing to address the con-
tinuing problems bequeathed society by the United States's history of 
slavery and Jim CroW.29 Politically, legally, and morally, this face-to-
face, duke-it-out aspect of unjust enrichment encourages some of the 
bellicose attitudes common on both sides of the reparations debate. 
While a little fire and brimstone can be a good thing, too much of the 
discussion of race in America and elsewhere is characterized by the 
various participants shouting past, rather than talking to, each other.30 
Nevertheless, I do not here wish to reject the confrontation model 
tOL:tlly. To a great extent, it forms what Professor Bell has called the 
26 See Horowitz, supra note 3, ~ 3. 
27 See id. n 3, 4. 
28 See id. This probably explains the popularity of "psychological harm" theories that 
seek to account for the experience of many African Americans in the continuing psycho-
logical harm bequeathed by slavery. Irma Jacqueline Ozer, Reparations for African ,'imericalls, 
41 How. LJ. 479, 492 (1998); Verdun, supra note 6, at 634. While I am somewhat sympa-
thetic to such arguments, I think there are candidates closer to home that do a better job 
of explaining what DuBois analyzed as the double-one might say multiple-categories of 
citizenship and community that African Americans must negotiate in order to have an 
American identity. See W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE SOULS m BLACK FOLK 3-4 (1931) (describing 
the double identity of a black as an African American, "even feel[ing] his dual iden tity-an 
American, a Negro"). Some of these candidates may be traceable back to slavery. But to 
focus on a unique psychological harm experienced by all descendants of slaves strays too 
close to essen tialism for my liking. 
29 See Keith N. Hylton, .4 Framework for Reparations Claims, 24 B.C. TIIlRD WORLD LJ. 31, 
36 (2004). Hylton argues that there is no direct link to be made between reparations law-
suits and broad uplift for African Americans. Sec id. 
30 See, e.g., PATRICIA VVILLIAMS, THE ROOSTER'S EGG: ON THE PERSISTENCE OF PREJU-
DICE 118-19 (1995) (providing example of people's anger when confronted with racial 
humor). 
2004] Reconceiving Reparations 53 
"emotional component"31 of reparations.32 In addition, the confronta-
tional legal model of individual and group rights has gained a great 
deal of popular recognition and now forms the populist understanding 
of reparations. A couple of examples from popular culture demon-
strate the appeal of this type of claim, even as it is caricatured. Chris 
Rock and Wanda Sykes have discussed reparations in recent comedy 
sketches on their respective and eponymous television shows.33 The 
sketches are somewhat similar. For example, on HBO's Chris Rnck Show, 
Rock stopped strangers on the street in two districts of New York. In 
Harlem, Rock found that Mrican Americans believed they deserved 
millions of dollars worth of reparations. In midtown Manhattan, Rock 
accosted white interviewees and demanded to know how much they 
were willing to pay for reparations. The most popular response to his 
request for even one dollar's worth of reparations was "[k]iss my white 
butt."34 In the variation of this segment run on Fox's Wanda, Sykes also 
decided to pursue her reparations on the street. "[S]he walked up to a 
white man and totted up his tab on an adding machine. She said to 
him, 'Hi, I'm black. You owe me fifteen dollars and thirteen cents,' and 
handed him the bill. "35 
These segments are certainly amusing; they also provide a subtle 
(or not so subtle) critique of the confrontational reparations model as 
31 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Book Review, Dissection ofl/Dream, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 156, 
158 (19i4) (arguing that "there is a tactical loss in excluding the slavery period: setting 
this voluntary limitation on coverage sacrifices much of the emotional component that 
provides the moral leverage for black reparations demands"). 
32 On one level, the confrontational model, in requiring that the conflicting rights of vic-
tim and perpetrator are judged in a structure that emphasizes nominal equality, serves to 
yalidate the legitimacy of the c1ainl of injury suffered by slaves and their descendants. See 
Matsuda, supra note 5, at 3i4-i5 (analogizing a reparations claim to the standard legal 
claim). On another level, the confrontational model can be regarded as a visceral expression 
of the outrage consequent to the psychological injury suffered during and after slavery. See 
l\lagee, supra note 5, at 894-95 (arguing that the "unwillingness of legislative reformers to 
eradicate the legacy of slavery through economic redistribution .... created a legal-political 
climate in which blacks were vulnerable to extreme opposition and intimidation"). 
33 See Nancy Franklin, Watching R'cinda: i1 Big Personality Hits the Small Screen, NEW 
YORKER, May 5, 2003, at 102-03 [hereinafter Franklin, Watching lH17!dal (discussing Wanda 
at Large); CharlesJ. Ogletree,Jr., The Case for Reparations, USA WEEKEND, Aug. 18,2002, '19 
[hel'einafter Ogeltree, The Case for Reperationsl (discussing The Chris Rock Show), available at 
http://www.llsaweekend.com/02_isslles/020818/020818reparations.htm!(last visited Nov. 
4, 2003). Wanda Sykes is herself a former star of, and writer for, The Chris Rock Show. Frank-
lin, 'Watching ~l'cinda, supm, at 102-03. 
34 See Ogletree, The Case for Repamtions, supra note 33, 'I 9. 
35 Franklin, Watching Randa, supm note 33, at 102. Viewed in light of The Black Mani-
festo, Sykes'S choice of just over fifteen dollars for reparations is perhaps not so fanciful: 
Forman also demanded fifteen dollars. See Magee, supra note 5, at 883. 
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a theory of compensation. So understood, I would suggest that the 
humor in these comedy sketches does not reside in the perceived ab-
surdity of the demand for reparations.36 Certainly, Rock graphically 
illustrates how race affects the divergent valuations of the injury suf-
fered, and part of the joke is the difference between the magnitude of 
the demand made by individual African Americans compared with 
the paucity of the white foils' payment. Sykes' sketch also interrogates 
the amount of reparations to be paid: here, the paucity of her de-
mand is part of the joke, as if an extra fifteen dollars could wash away 
the problems of slavery. But neither of these observations fully ac-
count for our laughter: the joke targets not so much the reparations 
claim itself37 as the manner in which it is presented-two aggressive 
African Americans picking randomly on individual whites. In fact, we 
laugh not only at the manner in which the demand for reparations is 
made, but the white person's discomfort at the manner in which the 
demand is made.38 
More particularly, both these segments embody, in a very literal 
sense, one version of the African-American demand for reparations. It 
is this literalness that contributes so strongly to the joke, which carries 
the weight it does precisely because it represents the confrontational 
view of reparations: blacks demanding money from whites (in the case 
of Rock and Wanda Sykes, right in your face) as a payment for wrongs 
inflicted during slavery. 
As good as confrontation feeis,39 however, if reparations, as a po-
litical and legal strategy, is to serve some other function than simply 
36 This would suggest that Horowitz's critique of reparations as a free handout for M-
rican Americans was the point made by the joke. Here, the joke draws upon the stereotype 
of Mrican Americans as ·playing the victim card." See, e.g., John l\,lcWhorter, Blood Money: 
Why I Don't Want Reparations for Slavery, AM. ENTER., July I, 2001, at 20 (discussing repara-
tions as an example of Mrican-American "victinlologist thought"), available at http://Mvw 
.theamericanenterprise.org/issues/articleid.15514/article_detail.asp (last visited Nov. 4, 
2003). On this understanding, the joke works because Rock and Sykes present themselves 
as representatives of a "debtor race." See FORDE-MAZRUI, supra note 5, at 26 n.99 (quoting 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen a, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia,j., concurring) ("In-
dividuals who have been wronged by unlawful racial discrimination should be made whole; 
but under our Constitution there can be no such thing as either a creditor or a debtor 
race."» . 
37 That is, it is not the fact that reparations is itself laughable. 
36 This analysis of the joke suggests that either the white person or the audience rec-
ognizes Mrican American claims as, in some way, justified. Additionally, in the Rock sketch, 
we may also laugh at the white person's ignorance of the validity of the reparations claim 
made by Mrican Americans. 
39 Part of the joke is the obvious relish with which Rock and Sykes make their demands 
for reparations. 
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being deployed as a tool with which to bludgeon whites, it is worth en-
dorsing only if it promotes debate, rather than accusatory monologues. 
The current multiplicity of litigative and legislative attempts to address 
the issue of reparations for African Americans suggests that the "con-
frontational" strategy is neither the only legal or political option nor 
the one most likely to succeed. The current reparations litigation and 
legislation that is being pursued domestically and internationally40 in-
dicates that the confrontational focus on slavery reparations may be too 
narrow to capture both the harm inflicted and the legal strategies to 
remedy that harm. The payoff of the confrontational strategy is both 
narrow and unimaginative and unlikely to produce the sort of social 
change envisaged by reparations proponents from the 1860's through 
the 1960's to today.41 It takes for granted that reparations proponents 
seek financial redress for wrongs inflicted in the past on the basis of 
some more-or-less moral or more-or-less legal theory of torts or unjust 
enrichmen t. 42 
Moving away from torts or unjust enrichment as the central repa-
rations strategy enables a reorientation of the reparations debate to 
40 See Alexander v. Governor of State of Oklahoma, No. 03-CV-133 (N.D. Okla. filed 
Feb. 28, 2003); In re African Am. Litig., No. 02-CV-7764 (N.D. III. filed Oct. 28, 2002); Hur-
dle v. F1eetBoston Fin. Corp., No. 02-CV-04653 (N.D. Cal. filed Sept. 25, 2002); Johnson v. 
Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 02-CV-2712 (E.D. La. filed Sept. 3, 2002); Porter v. L10yds of Lon-
don, No. 02-CV-6180 (N.D. Ill. filed Aug. 29, 2002); Ntzebesa v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 02-CV-
04712 (S.D.N.i: filed Jun. 19, 2002); Barber v. NT Life Ins. Co., No. 02-CV-2084 (D.N]. 
filed IvIay 2, 2002); Carrington v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. 02-CV-01863 (E.D.N.Y. filed 
Uar. 26, 2002); Farmer-Paellmann v. F1eetBoston Fin. Corp., No. 02-CV-1862 (E.D.N.Y. filed 
l\Iar. 26, 2002); Hurdle v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. CGC-02-412388 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed 
Sept. 10, 2002); see also Khulumani v. Barcla),s Nat'l Bank, No. 02-CV-05952, (E.D.NT filed 
Nov. 12, 2002) (seeking reparations for crinles practiced during Apartheid regime in South 
Africa). PortCl; Barbel; FamlC1cpaelbnann, Ca17'ington, Johnson. and Hurdle (02-CV-04653) have 
all been transferred to the Northern District of llIillois pursuant to 28 U .S.c. § 1407 (multi-
district litigation) and consolidated with In re ,4jrican A1II.elican Litig. See l\Iinute Order, In re 
,4jlican ,4melican Litig., No. 02-CV-7764 (N.D. I1I.Jan. 17, 2003). 
41 See Verdun, supra note 6, at 600-02 (noting that Thaddeus Stevens suggested repara-
tions to freed slaves before the Civil War; and noting episodes of political activism, includ-
ing claims in the 1960s and 1970). In fact, reparations argumen ts started significantly be-
fore 1860. Guinier, supra note 19, at 1720-2l. In 1829, David Walker "passionately 
protested the lack of compensation for the labor of slaves." /d. at 1721; see also Charles J. 
Ogletree, Jr., RcjJairing the Past: New Efforts in the Reparations Debate in Amclica, 38 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. RE\,. 279, 285-90 (2003) [hereinafter Ogletree, RejJailing the Past] (providing 
a brief history of the African American reparations movemen t). 
42 Sec. e.g .• Alfred L. Brophy, Some ConcejJtllal and Legal Problems in Reparations for Slavery, 
58 N.Y.U. ANN. SUR\,. AM. L. 497, 536-37 (2003) (discussing broad range of remedies 
sought bv reparations actidsts); Anthony J. Sebok, RCjJarations, Unjust Enrichment. and the 
ImjJortance of Knowing the Difference Between the Two. 58 NYU. ANN. SUR\'. AM. L. 651,654-57 
(2003) (discussing the problems with treating reparations claims as equit), claims). 
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focus on group uplift as a national imperative rather than as a sec-
tional imperative, as an "American thing" rather than as a "black 
thing." The current legal and legislative discussion of what repara-
tions is, and what types of reparations are appropriate, does and must 
depend upon a broader notion of the harm inflicted and must reflect 
the particular wrongs that need to be "repaired." That the harm 
inflicted and the benefits accrued are not singular but plural, affect-
ing a range of communities at different times and in different ways, 
enables a more nuanced response to reparations' critics and a more 
profound discussion of race in America and elsewhere. 
II. DIFFERENT LEGAL STRATEGIES IN REPARATIONS MOVEl\IENTS 
Confounding the narrow scope of the confrontational model, 
recent political and legal initiatives exposed the shortcomings of the 
confrontational model of reparations and developed alternative mod-
els of relief. By broadly reconceiving reparations as a goal or a claim 
or an argument, rather than as a strategy of monetary recompense, 
these initiatives demonstrate that significant progress can be made on 
the legal, legislative, moral, and political fronts. 
Although the different reparations movements do have common 
elements, the goals of reparations are multifarious. In essence, what 
links the various demands for reparations is that there be both an ac-
counting of and for past behavior, and some kind of reckoning for 
that behavior.43 It is this latter element-that there be a reckoning-
that distinguishes reparations from apology.44 The goal of the various 
reparations mOYements, which is implicit in the "reckoning" strand of 
the definition, is some sort of equitable redistribution of resources. 
Thus, as discussed in this section, all the currently filed reparations 
43 See, e.g., iamamoto, Racial Reparations, supra note 6, at 490-91 (comparing the Japa-
nese-American reparations claim to successful African-American reparations claims). I con-
sider the moral and philosophical underpinnings of reparations to be deeply and particularly 
American, drawing forcefully upon ideas embodied in the various founding political and 
philosophical texts that mark one strand of what counts as American distinctiveness. 
44 On apologies for racism, see generally Eric K. iamamoto, Race A.pologies, 1 J. GENDER 
RACE & JUST. 47 (1997). It is worth noting, however, that there has been no apology for 
slavery or Jim Crow segregation from the United States government. See Slavery Reparations 
Advocates Voice Denumds in H't'lshington, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2002, § 1, at 30. In contrast, the 
government has apologized for the internment of Japanese Americans during World War 
II. See Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U .S.C. app. § 1989 (1988). The govern men t has also 
apologized for its experimentation on African Americans without their knowledge in the 
Tuskegee syphilis case. See Alison Mitchell, Clinton Regrets 'Clearly Racist' U.S. Study, N.Y. 
TIMES, l\lay 17, 1997, § 1, at 10. 
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lawsuits seek not only some form of accounting for the harm(s) they 
identity, but also some form of compensation for that harm. But the 
appropriate reckoning depends upon the injury inflicted. This more 
general definition of reparations-as-reckoning permits a greater vari-
ety of political, moral, and particularly legal strategies directed at 
achieving the goal of redistribution of resources without specifying in 
advance what types of redistribution are appropriate and how the re-
distribution is to be accomplished.45 
There are currently a variety of legal strategies being pursued to 
obtain reparations both nationally and internationally.46 These strate-
gies essentially focus on two types of defendants: those corporations 
that have participated in and benefited from racial discrimination 
through slavery or Jim Crow; and those governmental entities that 
have practiced slavery or Jim Crow. As far as I am aware, there is only 
one lawsuit on file that names individual defendants rather than cor-
porations or government entities.47 This is no accident: generally, the 
goal so far has been to avoid pointing fingers at individuals. 
A. CorjJorate Difendants 
Edward Fagan and Roger Wareham are the two lead attorneys who 
have filed reparations lawsuits in Illinois, Texas, New York, New Jersey, 
and Louisiana.48 These attorneys rely principally upon the work of 
45 I believe the open-endedness of the "redistribution" issue is a virtue, not a vice. My 
view is that some of the most promising aspects of the reparations will prove to be the dis-
cussions of first, the relation between the harm and the proposed restitution and, second, 
the forms that restitution is to take. This latter argument challenges civil rights proponents 
to move from the defensive to the offensive. Rather than simply battling the rollback of the 
civil rights gains made during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s (a battle that remains worth 
fighting), reparations challenges civil rights activists to propose a positive agenda of social 
spending, and to layout the economic and social costs of that agenda. To this extent, while 
Professor Hylton's argumen ts regarding the justice and social welfare approaches are both 
forceful and challenging, they should be seen as marking the beginning, not the end, of 
the discussion, as they engage with but two of the multiple forms of reparations restitution 
potentially available. See Hylton, supra note 29, at 32-33. 
46 See Ogletree, Repairing the Past, supra note 41, at 294-97 (di~cussing variety of 
current reparations lawsuits). 
47 That suit is Carter v. Jones, No. 03-CV-0485 (W.O. Miss. 2003). While that complaint 
was filed by one of the local counsel in Ale:-:andcr v. Oklahoma, the Tulsa Race Riot case, it 
was not filed by the Reparations Coordinating Committee. The Reparations Coordinating 
Committee has certainly so far scrupulously avoided suing individuals. 
411 See First Amended & Consolidated Complaint at 113-15, In re African Am. Descen-
dants' Slave Litig., (N.D. Ill. 2003) (No. 1491) (on file with author); The OPeningS/lOts, 22 
AlII. LAWYER 6,June, 2002, Westlaw, 6/2002 Am. Law. 22; Bill Rigby, 12 Companies Face Slav-
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Deadria Farmer-Paellmann to identify corporations involved in slavery, 
and have listed her as the class plaintiff in the first-filed suit, Fal'mer-
Paellmann v. FleetBoston, filed in the Eastern District of New York on 
March 26, 2002.49 Each of these suits alleges five claims: conspiracy; 
demand for accounting; human rights violations; conversion; and un-
just enrichment.50 They follow the confrontational, unjust enrichment, 
model of reparations litigation, but add a relatively imaginative under-
standing of who ought to be defendants,51 suing corporations rather 
than the federal government.52 Nonetheless, these suits manifest a very 
traditional notion of the injury inflicted and the remedy required. 
Another set of lawsuits, filed in California by Attorney Barbara K. 
Ratliff, working again with Ms. Farmer-Paellmann, uses that state's 
private attorney general rule53 to sue corporations under California's 
Unfair Competition Law.54 That statute prohibits any "unlawful, unfair 
or fraudulent business act or practice." Included under the California 
statute is almost "anything that can properly be called a business prac-
tice and that at the same time is forbidden by law," and so the statute 
would appear to catch corporate involvement with slavery as being 
among those practices.55 The remedies authorized by the act include 
injunctive relief and restitution.56 So, by permitting anyone to bring 
suit on behalf of the state of California, this legislation allows litigants 
to avoid the problems of standing that affect the more traditional law-
suits and to produce a plaintiff that represents the whole community. 
Furthermore, the available remedies are somewhat broader than the 
ery Suits; Reparations Sought for Pre-1865 Gains, FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Sept. 4, 2002, Westlaw, 
9/4/02 sunsent 5A. 
49 See Complaint & Jury Trial Demand at 1, Farmer-Paellmann v. FleetBoston Fin. 
Corp. (E.D.N.Y 2002) (No. 02-CV-1862); Joyce Shelby, Slaves Seeking Redress Class Action 
Suitfor Reparations to Descendants, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 27, 2002, 2002 WL 3170753. 
50 See First Amended & Consolidated Complaint at 93-109, In re African .1m. Descen-
dants' Slave Litig. (N.D. III. 2003) (No. 1491). 
5) Though imaginative, this theory is consistent with the Holocaust litigation model. 
See generally Michael J. Bazyler, Nuremburg in America: Litigating the Holocaust in United States 
Courts, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 1 (2000) (examining comprehensively Holocaust litigation 
against banks, insurance companies, and German corporations). 
52 The federal government is popularly regarded as the most likely target for repara-
tions. 
53 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West 1980). 
54 See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 1997); Hurdle v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., 
No. 02-CV-04653, at 37-38 (N.D. Cal. filed Sept. 25, 2002); Hurdle v. FleetBoston Fin. 
Corp., No. CGC-02-0412388, at 37-38 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Sept. 10, 2002). 
55 Smith v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399,414 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). 
56 See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17203 (West 1997). 
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traditional injunctive relief lawsuit. Both of these sets of lawsuits seek 
to recover for the wrongs of slavery. 
One problem faced by such lawsuits is the more or less random 
manner in which their defendants are selected. Essentially, the defen-
dants in the current lawsuits happen to be those turned up by Ms. 
Farmer-Paellman during the course of her research.57 While her ef-
forts are laudable,58 it is not clear that they are particularly systematic. 
Such problems promise to be remedied by the spate of statutes and 
ordinances passed recently demanding an accounting of corporate 
involvement in slavery. A number of states and municipalities have 
passed legislation requiring corporations to divulge links with slavery, 
including California, Chicago, and Los Angeles.59 Such statutes prom-
ise to impose a measure of uniformity upon the information gathered 
and, in so doing, increase the equity of those lawsuits that sue various 
corporations or industries for profiting from slavery. 
Another problem is that, apart from a claim for unjust enrich-
ment, these lawsuits have not developed a theory of compensation 
beyond the "confrontational" demand for restitution of profits ac-
crued through slavery. Nonetheless, despite the problems with these 
lawsuits, they appear to provide a useful mechanism for developing 
alternative understandings of corporate responsibility for slavery. 
One way in which these lawsuits can develop alternative political 
and legal strategies for reparations claims is by exposing the vast un-
57 See James Cox, Reparations ,1ctivist: 'We're Still Living with the ~estiges of Slavery,' USA 
TODAY, Feb. 23, 2002, at A9 (noting that Farmer-Paellmann discovered 60 corporations 
that profited in slavery during the course of five years of research in libraries and online). 
58 See id. Professor Ogletree has stated that although "[tlhe idea of corporate involve-
ment has always been raised in the reparations movement ... I don't think anybody has 
been as conscientious or as thorough as Deadria. She is the key factor in making these 
(legal) claims come to life." Id. 
59 See California Slave Era Insurance Act, CAL. INS. CODE §§ 13810-13813 (West Supp. 
2003); John 1\1. Broder, The Business of SutVery & Penitence, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2003, § 4, at 
4 (discussing Los Angeles City Council's unanimous approval of "an ordinance ... that 
would require any company wishing to do business with Los Angeles to investigate and 
disclose any profits derived from the American slave trade"); Erika Kinetz, H'hat's the Cost of 
Freedom? What About Slavery?, N.V. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2003, § 14, at 6 (discussing a bill pro-
posed to the New York City Council that would require "companies doing business with 
the city to 'search their past and reveal whether they have engaged in or profited from 
slavery'''); Sabrina L. Miller & Gary Washburn, New Chicago Law Requires Finns to Tell Slavery 
Links, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 3, 2002, § 2, at 1. The most famous piece of modern reparations 
litigation, H.R. 40, first proposed by Representative John Conyers in 1989, also steers clear 
of the confrontational model, calling instead for an investigation of the wrongs inflicted by 
slavery without demanding reparations. See Commission to Study Reparations for Mrican 
Anlericans Act, H.R. 40, 108th Congo (2003). H.R. 40 should be seen as the inspiration 
behind much of the recent reparations legislation. 
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derdevelopment of the Mrican-American population. In particular, 
the concept of "underdevelopment" points to the systematic enslave-
ment and exploitation of the Mrican-American population that en-
sured that money and other resources were channeled to whites and 
denied to Mrican Americans.60 The concept of underdevelopment is 
used by Walter Rodney, Guyanese scholar and activist, to explain why 
Mrica failed to flourish despite its vast natural resources.61 He sug-
gests that Mrica was deliberately kept in an underdeveloped state by 
colonial exploiters to provide cheap minerals and free labor.62 The 
type of injury asserted through the Farmer-Paellmann lawsuits ap-
pears to fall within this type of analysis. Where, in Mrica, colonial 
whites enjoyed a higher standard of living at the expense of the Mri-
cans they subjugated,63 so too in America did white individuals from 
across the country profit from the wrongs of slavery and Jim Crow.51 
Reparations could thus include the goal of remedying this broad-
based harm, in part by explaining that the whole country profited in 
disparate ways from slavery and segregation. Such an emphasis calls 
for some form of educative initiative on the part of the corporations 
or industries sued by way of reckoning with their past. 
B. Tulsa Litigation 
A different form of litigation is that with which I am involved,65 
seeking reparations for the Tulsa Race Riot of 1921.66 This is a par-
ticularly traditional civil-rights lawsuit but a relatively imaginative 
reparations suit. A criticism of Mrican-American reparations has been 
its failure to present a legal strategy that comports with the type of 
claims usually advanced in a traditional civil rights lawsuit.67 Repara-
tions lawsuits just look too different from traditional civil rights litiga-
60 See WALTER RODNEY, How EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA 13-15 (1982). 
61Id. 
62 See id. at 149-50, 178-80. 
63Id. at 151. 
64 See MANNING MARABLE, How CAPITALISM UNDERDEVELOPED BLACK AMERICA: PROB-
LEMS IN RACE, POLITICAL ECONOMY, & SOCIEly2 (updated ed. 2000). 
65 See Randy Krehbiel, Big-name Attorneys Join Riot Lawsuit, TULSA WORLD, Feb. 26, 2003, 
at All ("Several sources say most of the work on the complaint filed Monday was done by 
[Professor Charles] Ogletree and Eric Miller. a relatively little known Harvard University 
lawyer."). 
66 See Alexander v. Governor of State of Okla., No. 03-CV-133 (N.D. Okla. filed Feb. 
28,2003). 
67 See \amamoto, Racial Repamtions, supra note 6, at 489-91 (comparing Japanese-
American and slavery lawsuits). 
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tion, cntlcs claim, to succeed in court.68 Indeed, the success of the 
Holocaust reparations litigation and Japanese-American reparations 
litigation has been in providing a traditional civil rights context for 
reparations cases and to focus on tolling or otherwise avoiding the 
statute of limitations.69 That is our tactic in the Tulsa case as welI.7° We 
can point to individual victims who have standing to sue, and also to a 
community wronged by state and municipal action or inaction.71 This 
type of lawsuit, which seeks injunctive and monetary relief, anticipates 
a relatively imaginative range of solutions to the problems of dis-
crimination in Oklahoma.72 
The innovations heralded by the Tulsa litigation do not end with 
the form of the lawsuit but extend into the types of remedies contem-
plated by such a suit. Part of the promise of the Tulsa litigation is to 
explore the extent to which a reparations lawsuit can replicate the 
bilateral model of rights and duties and yet simultaneously develop 
other theories of rights and remedies.73 The opportunity presented by 
the Tulsa litigation is to provide a broad-based educational program 
68 See id.; see also Hylton, supra note 29, at 32-33, 37-40 (discussing Fannel,Paellrnann 
lawsuit as markedly different from traditional civil-rights lawsuits). 
69 See \amamoto, Racial Reparations, supra note 6, at 490; see also ALFRED BROPHY, RE-
CONSTRUCTING THE DREAMLAND: THE TULSA RIOT OF 1921, at 103-04,105,109-10 (2002). 
70 See BROPHY, supra note 69, at 103-19. The single most important work setting forth 
the legal justifications for the Tulsa lawsuit is Professor Brophy's book on the Tulsa Riot of 
1921. Professor Brophy and his book have been instrumental in authoritatively determin-
ing the factual basis for the claims in A.lexander v. Govemor of State of Oklahoma. See Alexander, 
No. 03-CV-133. 
71 See First Amended Complaint at 2-10, Alexander (No. 03-CV-133) (Feb. 28, 2003), 
available at http://www.ncobra.org/pdffiles/FirstAmendedComplaint.pdf (last "isited Nov. 
4,2003). 
72 For example, the concept of underdevelopment applies to this lawsuit as to the slav-
ery suits. Before the riot and, ironically, in large part due to racial discrimination, money 
spent by African Americans in Greenwood tended to stay in Greenwood to the benefit of 
the whole community. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Current RejJarations Debate, 36 V.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1051, 1067-68 (2003) [hereinafter Ogletree, The Current Reparations Debate) 
("Before the Riot, the black dollar would circulate thirty-five times before leaving the 
community."). The riot ended all of that; after the riot, Greenwood dollars wen t directly to 
whites. [d. In recognition of that fact, the 1921 Tulsa Race Riot Reconciliation Act of 2001 
created the Greenwood Area Redevelopment Authority ("GARA") to stimulate business in 
Greenwood. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74 §§ 8221-8226 (West Supp. 2003). It remains to be 
seen whether GARA has the desired effect of undoing the damage caused by the riot, al-
though initial reports are not encouraging. See P J. Lassek, Action Delayed on Proposal for 
Higher Park Fees, TULSA WORLD, Jan. 25, 2002, at 13 (reporting delays and objections to 
appointments to GARA). Given that the riot had repercussions throughout the state, how-
ever, some form of statewide initiative modeled upon GARA may also be appropriate. 
73 It is this aspect of reparations litigation that is so far ignored by the Farmer-Paellmrtnll 
lawsuit. 
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that alerts the people of Oklahoma to the history of racism that pre-
cipitated the riot and continued in its wake.74 I think it is clear that 
the unjust enrichment model is insufficient to organize a diverse, 
grassroots activism. 
Interestingly, much of the impetus to develop broad-based and 
innovative relief comes from the Oklahoma Commission to Study the 
Tulsa Race Riot of 1921, which was created by the state of Oklahoma in 
part to account for the state's and city's responsibility for entrenching 
Jim Crow.75 Not only did the Commission have the power to publish 
new information discovered through a painstaking search through his-
torical records, but the state also empowered it to make recommenda-
tions. 76 In uncovering much previously unavailable material, the Com-
mission recommended that reparations should be paid to the survivors 
and descendants. 77 Nevertheless, the process of reckoning recom-
mended by the Commission has been implemented haltingly, if at all, 
by the state of Oklahoma and the city of Tulsa. The lawsuit was there-
fore filed with the goal, not only of achieving restitution for the survi-
vors of the riot, but compelling the state and city to complete the proc-
ess begun by the Riot Commission. 
Any solution intended to address the consciousness-raising aspect 
central to the educational, political, and moral aspirations of repara-
tions requires a holistic approach that adequately informs people 
about the real history of racial inequality in Oklahoma. Some form of 
broad injunctive relief may prove appropriate here. Although there 
are major obstacles to obtaining relief from the state,78 injunctive re-
lief may be warran ted if, as in Alexander v. Governor of State of Oklahoma, 
a state officer is sued in his or her official capacity.79 
74 See generally SCOTT ELLSWORTH, DEATH IN A PROMISED LAND: THE TULSA RIOT OF 
1921 (1982) (documenting racism in Tulsa leading up to the riot and warning that a ·seg-
regation of memory" will continue to exist "as long as the injustice which has bred it con-
tinues"). 
75 A significant alternative source has been the pioneering work and insightful sugges-
tions of Professor Alfred Brophy, another contributor to this symposium. 
76 See OKLA. COMM'N TO STUDY THE TULSA RACE RIOT OF 1921, TuLSA RACE RIOT, at ii 
(Comm. Print 2001), available atwww.tulsareparatiolls.org/TRR.htm. 
77 [d. at 20. 
78 The most notable obstacle is the Eleventh Amendment's grant of sovereign immu-
nity to the states. See U.S. CON ST. amend. XI. "The heart of the Eleventh Amendment is its 
grant of state sovereign immunity from federal court monetary relief designed to compen-
sate for past wrongs." IB MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ &JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGA-
TION: CLAIMS & DEFENSES § 8.3, at 156 (3d ed. 1997). 
79 See First Amended Complaint at 192, Alexander v. Governor of State of Oklahoma, 
(N.D. Okla. 2003) (No. 03-CV-133) (on file with author). Under the doctrine announced 
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Interestingly, the state itself has established the necessary histori-
cal nexus80 between the riot and its current remedial efforts in enact-
ing the Tulsa Race Riot of 1921 Reconciliation Act of 2001.81 The 
state's chosen remedy-to set up an education fund that provides no 
more help to the descendants of survivors than was previously avail-
able82-appears insufficient on its face, given the state's active sup-
pression of the riot and its recognition that it participated in a "con-
spiracy of silence."83 Some more general educational relief is not only 
warranted morally, but legally as well. 
To this end, a principal goal of the Tulsa and other reparations 
litigation should be to educate the community about the state of race 
relations in the community affected. Put differently, when the impact 
of the discrimination at the basis of the wrong is state wide, a state-
wide educational remedy should be sought.84 There are many re-
sources the state could use to accomplish this goal that are already at 
its disposal. Perhaps one appropriate form of injunctive relief would 
be to require the state to create a commission to study a curriculum. 
This curriculum would be taught in all schools and would describe 
the history of race relations in Oklahoma that created the riot and the 
various other incidents of race-based violence and discrimination 
both before and after the riot, so as to permanently end the "conspir-
acy of silence "85 that has for so long dominated these issues. The de-
in Ex parte roung, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908), suits against a state officer in his or her 
official capacity for prospective injunctive or declaratory relief are permissible under the 
Eleventh Amendment. "The IOllng doctrine recognizes that if a state official violates fed-
eral law, he is stripped of his official or representative character and may be personally 
liable for his conduct; the State cannot cloak the officer in it~ sovereign immunity." Idaho 
v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 288 (1997) (O'Connor,]., concurring); Wolfe v. In-
gram, 275 F.3d 1253, 1260 (10th Cir. 2002). 
80 See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 67 (1985) (holding that there must be some ·on-
going violation of federal law" that provides a nexus between the relief requested and the 
injury asserted). 
81 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 2621-2627 (West Supp. 2003) (authorizing Tulsa Rec-
oncili;ltion Education and Scholarship Program ("TRESP")); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, 
§ 8000.1 (West 2002) (making legislative findings); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 8201.1 
(West 2002) (creating race riot memorial committee); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 8205 
(West 2002) (certifying riot survivors); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, §§ 8221-8226 (creating 
Greenwood Area Redevelopment Authority ("GARA") . 
82 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 2621-2627 (West Supp. 2003). 
53 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 8000.1 (West 2002). 
B4 To use the language of reckoning and accounting introduced at the beginning of 
this paper, a full accoun ting of the causes and effects of the riot suggests a statewide series 
of injuries, and a proper reckoning for those injuries suggests a series of statewide re-
sponses. 
B5 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 8000.1 (West 2002). 
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velopment of such educational programs will benefit not only the de-
seen dan ts of riot victims, but all Oklahomans. In this way, even though 
reparations lawsuits begin in confrontation, it may be possible to de-
velop a model in which they end in consensus. 
III. A NEW MODEL OF MORAL DISCOURSE FOR REPARATIONS: THE 
CONVERSATIONAL MODEL 
The discussion so far has focused primarily on describing the 
manner in which reparations litigation could go beyond a narrow fo-
cus on the bilateral or confrontational model of reparations to de-
velop more diverse strategies and remedies. In turn, these alternate 
political and legal strategies suggest a larger moral argument for 
reparations that embraces the complexity of race relations in Amer-
ica. In particular, the experiences of the Tulsa and other reparations 
litigation can and should be placed in the context of a moral argu-
ment for a national interest in the goal of reparations. My goal is first 
to establish the foundation for a moral argument for reparations, 
which I refer to as the "conversational model," and then to apply this 
moral framework in the context of reparations claims. 
Once one steps outside the confrontational framework of a battle 
between individual rights, the moral argument for reparations is per-
haps more complex than is generally suggested. As noted, reparations 
claims are popularly characterized by a confrontational model of in-
dividual or group rights that pits one party's right to compensation 
against another party's right to be left alone.86 In morality, this com-
ports with a view of rational choice in which, if reasons compete, deci-
sion should be made for the strongest reason. Here, reason (a reason) 
determines which option an agent ought to choose: she ought to 
choose that option which has strongest, or weightiest, or best reasons 
in its support. Choosing an option involves no more that discovering 
the strongest reason and applying it. On this model, to use Professor 
Dworkin's catchphrase, there is never "no right answer."87 Reason de-
termines conclusively which option ought to win out. The decision-
maker's choice is therefore simply to be rational or irrational-to fol-
86 See Aleinikoff, supra note 8, at 962; McFadden, supra note 8, at 596; see also text ac-
companying notes 6-8, supra. 
87 See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 144-45 (1985). Dworkin believes 
that comparison of conflicting options enables us to decide on the basis of reason: the 
strongest reason wins out. Id. Even when comparison is difficult, or impossible, Dworkin 
contends, and in principle no choice is demonstrably better than another, we ought still to 
act as if there is one right answer to the controversy. Id. 
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low reason or ignore it-nothing more. Professor Bernard Williams 
calls this view "a rationalistic conception of rationality. "88 It appears to 
set up a zero-sum game in which one or other of the positions is sub-
stantively unreasonable. 
This model of rights is appealing because it seems to settle with 
finality one's entitlement to reparations. Nevertheless, as any student of 
jurisprudence or constitutional law should be aware, establishing the 
relative weight of conflicting rights is certainly not a science or even, I 
would claim, an art. 89 The "balancing" model of weighing competing 
rights or interests founders because there may be no final or objective 
way to determine which interests ought to be included in the balance.9o 
Balancing does not provide an independent way of identifYing whose 
interest is to prevail.91 To extend the "balancing" metaphor, there may 
be no way-independent of personal or judicial preference-to cali-
brate the scales, or even to determine what scales we should use. If the 
scales are not objective, then who decides how to balance the interests? 
This worry is the basis for the charge that balancing is subject to arbi-
trariness, and that it may permit the improper (because unbounded) 
use of discretion or ideology to determine the outcome. Thus, under 
the individual rights model of morality, certainty proves elusive. 
My alternative proposal does not seek to establish the conclusive 
sort of certainty attempted by the individual rights model. Instead, I 
propose a vision of moral argument in which reparations is not neces-
sarily asserted as a claim or as imposing an obligation. This theory 
suggests that morality should be considered as a process of argu-
ment-of stating one's position in relation to another, and elaborat-
ing the claims that one can make on the other, or the other can make 
on oneself. On this vision of moral argument, the goal is to elaborate 
one's position relative to another in a dynamic process in which one 
seeks to determine what claims, excuses, reasons, and justifications 
you and I are entitled to enter, and what weight they have for us. 
88 BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 18 (1985). 
89 A1einikoff, supra note 8, at 962. 
90 See id. at 972 ("[T]he Court has no objective criteria for valuing or comparing the 
in terests at stake."). 
91 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
("Primary responsibility for adjusting the interests which compete in the situation before 
us of necessity belongs to the Congress .... We are to set aside the judgment [of legisla-
tors] only if there is no reasonable basis for it."). In this case, Justice Frankfurter attempted 
to turn over calibration of the balance's scale to the legislature, unless the legislature 
proved wholly unreasonable. [d. at 526. 
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This thought may be elucidated by turning to that staple of legal 
analogy: games.92 Professor Stanley Cavell,93 a prominent philosopher 
in the ordinary language tradition of J.L. Austin and Ludwig Wittgen-
stein, suggests that a defining feature of games is that they have rules 
both to define the various offices occupied by the players or the 
pieces94 and to regulate the consequences within the game particular 
to those offices.95 To justify a particular move in a game, we may point 
to the office occupied by the player or the piece, the rules regulating 
how that player or piece moves, and also the background principles 
or maxims developed by skilled players of the game that suggest ap-
propriate strategies to play wel1.96 Thus, "characterization in terms of 
definition" will identify positions, moves, arrangements, etc., while 
"characterization in terms of form (,Whenever A do B', which tells 
you, given a knowledge of the former rules, what must or may be 
done)" will provide justification within the rules of the game.97 
This description of the manner in which we justify our actions ap-
plies not only to games, but also to morality and law. The essential simi-
larity between justification of our actions both inside and outside of the 
context of games is that '1ustifying what is done ... always presupposes 
a particular desCliption of what was done; under one description it may 
have been (called) dishonest, under another, courageous."98 
92 See Charles Yablon, On the Contribution of Baseball to American Legal Theo'ry, 104 YALE 
LJ. 227, 227-29 (1994) (demonstrating how game rules, specifically baseball rules, are 
useful in understanding American legal theory). 
93 Walter M. Cabot Professor of Aesthetics and the General Theory of Value at Har-
vard, Emeritus. 
94 What is a batter or a pitcher; what is a rook or a pawn; what is a king or an ace; who 
holds the rope and who skips. 
95 See STANLEY CAVELL, THE CLAIM OF REASON 305 (1979) [hereinafter, CAVELL, THE 
CLAIM OF REASON]. In baseball, such rules include where the batter stands, how the batter 
moves around the bases, how the batter scores or is given out, what constitutes a pitch, a 
strike, a ball, etc.; in chess, how the pieces move, etc. In skipping, there may be a number 
of different rules depending on the complexity of the skipping game. At its simplest, the 
skipper cannot keep counting skips towards his or her total if he or she gets tangled in the 
rope. 
96 Id. at 306. In games, not every move is determined by the rules: "[A] certain mastery 
of a game is required in order to be said to play [a] game at all. A knowledge of every 
competitive game ... i.e., every game for which there are principles of play, requires an 
understanding of its principles as well as a knowledge of its defining rules." Id. at 304. 
Thus, there are plays in baseball and moves in chess that are determined by the state of the 
game and the standard optimal responses to what the opponent is doing. Here, a 
justification in terms of the defining or regulatory rules may not answer a question about 
the appropriateness of a given move. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
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Nonetheless, in morality, in contrast to games and the law, there 
are no defining rules.99 We cannot appeal to express rules to define 
the relevant roles we are to occupy. Thus, one may treat a friend dif-
ferently than a stranger: 100 defining these roles is not, however, ac-
complished in terms of an appeal to particular published rules of 
friendship or stranger-hood. Each individual is equally authoritative 
in defining his or her offices and moves-that is, the roles the indi-
vidual characterizes others, as well as him or herself, as holding. 
Law appears to be more akin to games than to morality in terms 
of providing express rules that define and regulate action. Legal rules 
often operate not to tell us, prospectively, what to do, but to define 
what facts and acts are relevant to a given issue, characterize those 
facts in a legally acceptable manner, position legal actors in relation to 
other agents, and define the consequences of that position. In so do-
ing, law provides a standard by which to measure ourselves and our 
behavior. As Professor Honore suggests: 
The law is concerned with the relations between human beings 
and between them and animate or inanimate objects viewed 
from a special point of vantage. To attain this point of vantage 
requires the transformation of the data of ordinary life in to 
those of a special drama with its own personages, costumes and 
conventions .... To set the stage for this drama the law catego-
rizes actions, even ts, personalities, and conditions in a special 
way and then, from their subsumption in to the appropriate 
category, draws conclusions as to the legal position of the 
drama tis personae and res, their possibilities of acting and suffer-
ing, and their mutual relations. The various types of law are 
concerned with the parts of the dramatic dialectic. 101 
In law, as in games and morality, our actions do not come ready 
labeled. There may be room to dispute how to characterize a legally-
99 See, c.g .• STANLEY CAVELL, CONDITIONS HANDSOME AND UNHANDSOME: THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF EMERSON IAN PERHCTONISM 113-14 (1990) [hereinafter CAVELL, CONDITIONS) 
("In the moral life the equivalent finality is carried ... by judgment of moral finality ... one 
whose resolution is not settled by appeal to a rule defining an institution."). 
100 It is precisely this difference that makes pre-nuptial agreements such an awkward 
device in a relationship: a pre-nuptial agreement broaches stranger-hood on the eYe of a 
deep commitment to intimacy. To settle the agreement, one must often engage in the sort 
of arms-length bargaining that characterizes much of contract law. 
101 Al\L Honore, Real Laws, in LAW, MORALITY, & SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF 
H.L.A. HART 99, 112 (P.M.S. Hacker & Joseph Raz eds., 1977). 
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relevant act,102 and such a disagreement may (but need not) be mor-
ally or legally important. Whether the different ways we characterize 
an act make a difference to an individual's moral or legal status will 
depend upon the options available to explicate the act in terms of the 
justifications, excuses, and other "elaboratives"103 open to the actor. 
For example, whether an act is determined to be one of borrowing or 
stealing may have different moral or legal consequences, though the 
act may (but need not) be substantially the same in both cases. 
This ability to re-describe or re-label acts is especially important 
for the law, which tends to "channel" (as Professor Fuller would put 
it) 104 "ordinary" actions in to legal categories. That is, the law often re-
conceptualizes acts that can be described in everyday language utiliz-
ing everyday concepts into specifically legal institutions such as tort, 
contract, testation, trusts, marriage, and divorce. 105 Furthermore, it is 
readily apparent in the legal context (but equally important in the 
moral or political context) that these characterizations may also de-
termine an agent's or act's relevance or importance: it is usually ir-
relevant for purposes of describing the act of stealing whether the 
agent is an actress, a violinist, or a waiter-even though the agent may 
describe him or herself primarily in these terms. Thus, the significance 
of a particular description may include not only the available 
justifications, but also what are to be the consequences of such a deci-
SIon. 
I suggest that the disagreement over the characterization of an 
act in a moral context is significant because it raises the question of 
the continuation of our community. That is, through our disagree-
ments over the characterization of our acts, we sometimes discover 
that we evaluate the meaning of our acts using different schemes of 
valuation and that adhering to one or other scheme has conse-
quences for the manner in which we regard ourselves or other peo-
ple. 106 On this view, what matters for one person might not matter for 
another, and vice versa. In the end, both persons might be right be-
cause they may be working with separate, incommensurable schemes 
102 See generally G.E.1\1. ANSCOMBE, INTENTION (2d ed. 1976) (providing perspective on 
the concept of action and a reason for acting). 
\03 Seegenemlly STANLEY CAVELL, MUST WE MEAN WHAT WE S.w? (1976). 
104 See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COI.Utvl. L. REV. 799, 801-03 (1941) 
(explaining that law, like language, calls on people to channel their experiences into 
particular forms "for the legally effective expression of in tention"). 
105 Neil MacCormick, Law as Institutional Fact, 90 L.Q. REV. 102, 105 (1974). 
\06 So, adopting a particular scheme may permit or preclude us from adopting a par-
ticular characterization of ourselves or our acts, or others or their acts. 
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of valuation.107 Thus, the issue is whether we can respect the other's 
scheme ofyaluation, and if so, how. 
To illustrate this point, it is helpful to draw upon one of the most 
intriguing recent discussions of race-that proposed by Professor 
Patricia Williams, a well known scholar on critical race theory. Williams 
attempts to chart the consequences of what is sometimes called "igno-
rance" in ordinary dialogue. lOS For example, one of Williams's friends 
believed her bo)friend was overly frugal: as the friend described him, 
he "ha[d] a bit ofthe Jewish in him."lo9 When Williams objected to that 
characterization as having "harmful implications," the friend first 
apologized but maintained through her characterizations of what she 
meant to say that she believed "stinginess was aJewish 'thing."'lIO 
As we argued, words like "overly sensitiye" ... and "touchy" 
began to creep into her description of me. She accused me 
of building walls .... I tried to reassure her that ... I had 
not meant to attack or upset her, and that I deeply valued 
her friendship. But ... I felt our friendship being broken 
apart. She would be consoled with nothing less than a retrac-
tion of my opinion .... She didll't want me to understand 
107 Sec JOSEPH RAZ, THE !I[ORALITY OF FREEDOM 322 (1986) ("A and B are incommen-
surate if it is neither true that one is better than the other nor true that they are of equal 
value."); sec also MICHAEL STOCKER. PLURAL & CONfLICTING VALUES 169 (1990) (explain-
ing that pluralists recognize "that choice importantly involves determining which values to 
pursue and which to forego" while monists "tell us that these choices and all other choices 
are to be made simply on the basis of pleasure "). 
108 Sec PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS. THE ALCHEMY Of RACE & RIGHTS 64, 84-91. 125, 166 
(1991) [hereinafter WILLIAMS, ALCHEMY]; WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 118-19. To my 
mind, Williams is the legal chronicler par excellence of these moments in which individu-
als feel slighted and no longer able to sustain a conversation. She is not the only or best 
known one. Sec, e.g., JAMES BALDWIN, Down at tlte Cross: A Letter from a Region in ,Hy Afind, in 
THE FIRE NEXT TIME 29, 69-iO (1963) (describing a bartender's refusal to sene him at a 
bar and the ensuing conversation \vith and hurt feelings of a white bystander). Williams's 
examples of the various responses elicited through racial dialogue are not simply her ra-
cially or politically loaded interpretations of these conversations or discussions; rather, they 
are examples of what \Vittgenstein might call "language games"; they are examples of eve-
ryday or ordinary language usage that chart what might be called the "implications" en-
tailed by the use of a word or concept in a particular context. Sec CAVELL, suj})'{{ note 103, 
at 9. Her project in The Alchemy of Race and Rigllts has, I would suggest, much in common 
with the goals of ordinary language philosophy. Sec id. at 3-16 (describing ordinary lan-
guage philosophy and its in terests and techniques). 
109 WILLIAMS, ALCHEMY, supra note 108, at 125. 
110 Id. 
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merely that she meant no harm, but wanted me to confess 
that there was no harm.lll 
Williams's example demonstrates how two individuals can fight 
over the characterization of their words and acts, and how these com-
peting characterizations draw on values that are embedded in our dis-
course on race and are likely to resurface in uncomfortable ways.1I2 
More importantly, perhaps, her discussion elaborates upon how the 
refusal to acknowledge the other's point of view has serious conse-
quences for continuing to exist "in community" with each other: a 
relationship is damaged, perhaps irreparably, and a conversation on 
race and religion is shattered. ll3 Professor Cavell considers this 
breakdown of community exemplified in the circumstances presented 
in Hendrik Ibsen's play it Doll's HOllse,114 when the heroine, Nora 
Helmer, refuses to accept the constraints placed upon her humanity 
by her role as a wife. Cavell suggests that Nora is unable to express 
adequately her dissatisfaction with the terms in which her husband, 
Torvald, frames the discussion (the values he espouses) precisely be-
cause the sorts of reasons she advances are not reasons he can, or 
would accept.ll5 In this sort of situation Nora feels slighted (they both 
do), conversation has broken down, reasons have run out. Torvald is 
apt to characterize her "as a foolish child and as out of her senses, as if 
she is to blame for the [moral, emotional, etc.] shipwreck, as if it ex-
ists only if she says it does. "116 And Nora's response is to insist that she 
is not the person Torvald thought she was; she has changed, moved 
on, past his comprehension.1l7 
In this sort of situation, there are no additional reasons that can 
persuade the participants of the other's good faith, or that they ought 
I1lId. 
112 The idea that conflicts between values can remain unresolved and recurring in dif-
ferent contexts may be explained by adopting Duncan Kennedy's concept of "nesting." 
Nesting is "the reproduction of the particular argumentative oppositions within the doc-
trinal structures that apparently resolve them." Duncan Kennedy, A. Semiotics oj Legal A.rgu-
ment, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 75, 112 (1991). 
113 Understanding is replaced by confrontation: Williams's friend's inability to admit a 
wrong engendered an insecurity that could only be remedied by \'\'illiams's admission of 
\Hongdoing. This is an all too human situation. 
114 HENDRIK IBSEN, A DOLL'S HOUSE (Charlotte Barclund trans. 1996). 
115 See CAVELL, CONDITIONS, supra note 99, at 113; IBSEN, supra note 114, at 96-106. 
116 CAVELL, CONDITIONS, supra note 99, at 113. 
117 Cavell's foclls on "comedies of remarriage" elaborates how these relationships can 
be recovered. See STANLEY CAVELL, PURSUITS Of' HAPPINESS: THE HOLLYWOOD COMEDY OF 
REMARRIAGE 189-228 (1981) [hereinafter CAVELL, PURSUITS OF HAPPINESS] (discllssing 
the film A.dam 's Rib). 
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to converse again. There are no reasons because everything that 
could be said, has been said: it is not as if one does not know what the 
other is saying, or has misunderstood it so that something more can 
be said to clarifY the issue. Instead of saying something, what is re-
quired is that something be shown: what Malcolm X would call re-
spect; what Cavell calls equality.lIS vVhile we cannot prove the fact of 
our community, one way to express it-perhaps the only way-is to 
enact it, by responding to or acknowledging the other as an equal. 
What emerges from this discussion is a vision of morality that 
does not depend upon demand but upon what might be called "con-
yersation."119 Morality is considered as a process of argument where 
disagreements emerge over the characterization of our acts and what 
such a characterization ought to mean to oneself or to others. Dis-
agreement becomes significant when our continued community mat-
ters, and we are challenged to find ways in which to respect each 
other's different schemes of valuations. Sometimes acknowledgment 
of our respective positions is all that is required. Sometimes some 
greater reckoning is warranted before we can find a way to "go on" 
together. Which is which may not be obvious at the outset and may 
change as our conversation progresses. 
IV. FITTING REPARATIONS 'WITHIN THE "CONVERSATIONAL" MODEL 
Having outlined the contours of the conversational framework, 
we can now apply it to reparations claims. Simply put, the conversa-
tional model, as compared to the confrontational model of individual 
rights. offers a better means of satisfYing reparations claims. 
Reparations arguments may be considered as one of the ways of 
re-characterizing acts or situations in ways that are morally or politi-
cally significant. The claims made through reparations are useful, in 
part, by ruling out certain arguments from the get-go as having the 
weight others wish to put on them. Thus, if reparations succeeds in 
tracing the underdevelopment of African A.mericans by whites, cer-
tain notions of desert and failure, responsibility and innocence, are 
ruled out of the debate on race, discrimination, and their conse-
quences for American society.120 Here, the question becomes one of 
118 CAVELL. THE CLAIM OF REASON. supm note 95, at 23. 
119 That is, "conversation" in the fullest sense of that term, in which people not only 
talk, bu t listen and respond. 
120 The long history of racial discrimination has severelv disadvantaged African Ameri-
cans to the benefit of white Americans, as argued by the NAACP in its brief in Grutter v. 
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community: whether we can find a common set of valuations that en-
able us to evaluate the significance of our acts. This issue of common 
valuations may be more or less fateful, depending upon how impor-
tant we hold the acts or claims or definitions to be-whether one of 
us finds them so important that we are willing to risk our relationship 
over it. l2l This was President Lincoln's question;122 it was also, per-
haps, Malcolm X's. It remains a valid one today: the more so in light 
of the claim that, in the face of international terror, this is a nation 
that wishes to stand united. 123 Reparations helps in terrogate what is to 
be the content of that unity. 
To make this rather cryptic assertion somewhat more concrete, 
consider the following hypothetical. Suppose Justice Scalia takes his 
usual position and, from an individual rights perspective, points out 
that his family came to America after the end of slavery and is there-
fore not responsible for any acts of discrimination.124 People in that 
position can plausibly claim not only that reparations advocates are 
seeking to hold them accountable for the acts of now dead people, 
but that those now dead people bear no relation to them, morally or 
personally. While this individual rights argument is valid in itself, the 
appropriate response, from the perspective of the conversational 
model, is not to answer in kind, but to change gear. One answer is to 
suggest that white people are collectively responsible for the wrongs 
Bollinger. See Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. at 21-22, Grut-
ter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (No. 02-214). Reparations seeks to build upon the 
types of arguments advanced by the NAACP by identifying specific instances in which dis-
crimination harmed specific individuals, and by forcing America to confront the reality of 
discrimination and the millions of lives it has affected. 
121 See generally CAVELL, PURSUITS OF HAPPINESS, supra note 117 (discussing seven films 
about the "comedy of remarriage"). 
122 See William Michael Treanor, Learning from Lincoln, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1781, 
1781-86 (1997) (discussing the relation of slavery and nation in Lincoln's interpretations 
of the United States Constitution); see also LOIS J. EINHORN, AIIRAHAM LiNCOLN THE ORA-
TOR 151-66 (Address at Cooper Institute, New York, 1860), 169-·76 (First Inaugural Ad-
dress, 1861), 179-80 (Second Inaugural Address, 1865) (1992). In all these speeches, Lin-
coln is keenly aware of the extent to which toleration of slavery and the survival of the 
Union are intermingled. 
123 The phrase "united we stand" has assumed particular significance in the months af-
ter the September II, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. See Susan Sontag, 
Real Battles and Empty Metaphors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2002, at A25. 
124 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure, in 2 AHIRMATIVE ACTION & THE CON-
STITUTION 83, 88 (Gabriel Chin ed., 1998) (emphasizing that early ethnic white immi-
grants, including his father, suffered discrimination but also conceding that some of these 
inlmigrants practiced, and indeed, benefited from discrimination). 
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of slavery,125 Yet, this may not entirely capture the claim being entered 
here. While it is certainly possible to suggest that African Americans 
suffer a "group harm" as a result of the continuing perpetuation of 
the "badges and inciden ts" of slavery, and while it is also true that 
whiteness conveys benefits not available to African Americans, that is 
not to say that whites are obligated to redress the balance by virtue of 
the benefit alone. 
The real issue emerges when we apply the conversational model 
rather than the confrontational one to reparations arguments. The 
question becomes one of what to do in the face of a history of dis-
crimination. \'Vho bears responsibility for redeeming that past, and 
what are the consequences of failing to address it? Thoreau, address-
ing a similar problem in his essay Civil Disobedience, suggested that: 
It is not a man's duty, as a matter of course, to devote himself 
to the eradication of any, even the most enormous wrong; he 
may still properly have other concerns to engage him; but it 
is his duty, at least, to wash his hands of it .... If I devote my-
self to other pursuits and contemplations, I must first see, at 
least, that I do not pursue them sitting upon another man's 
shoulders. I must get off him first, that he may pursue his 
contemplations toO.126 
The sort of reparations argument I have in mind seeks to account 
for one's present position by looking at how we got here. It asks how 
we are to account for our present positions-did we get here by divine 
providence or blind luck alone, or must we acknowledge other fac-
tors?127 Reparations seeks to point to the ways in which modern Amer-
ica benefited from de jure and de facto discrimination. At the least, it 
rules out the argument that "I made it on my own." It precludes the 
sort of social and economic isolationist or social Darwinist foundation 
upon which SHch arguments appear to rest and emphasizes the linger-
ing effects that the roles slavery and segregation played in establishing 
the relative social inequality of African Americans as compared to 
other racial or ethnic groups. Reparations as a moral argument, at its 
125 This is certainly what Horowitz takes reparations to claim. See Horowitz, supra note 
3, 'll 2. It is also reminiscent of the "They Owe Us" rallying cry of certain reparations activ-
ists. See Jenkins & Harris, supra note 2, at Cl. 
126 Henry David Thoreau, Civil Disobedience, in 'VALDEN & CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 16, 23 
(Paul Lallter ed., 2000). 
127 See gel/cmlly STANLEY CAVELL, THE SENSES OF WALDEN: AN EXPANDED EDITION 
(1992) (providing compelling insight into Thoreau's HIdden). 
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minimum, makes it impossible for citizens to ignore the contribution 
of slavery and of de jure segregation to the character of our society. 
Thoreau's suggestion that we must at least "wash our hands" of this 
"enormous wrong" suggests that some affirmative act must be taken to 
expiate that past. And it raises the question of how successful hand-
washing can be for avoiding or repudiating responsibility for the 
community's act-how we can distance ourselves from the wrongs of 
others. There is, I believe, no systematic answer to this question. 
One way to address the issue, however, is to recognize that the 
reparations debate is, in part, over how we as a nation participate in 
our life together, particularly through our national institutions. 128 
Reparations points out that these institutions were founded upon dis-
crimination, demands that we not ignore this fact but finally acknowl-
edge it, and attempts to account for how even those who do not want 
to act can "wash their hands," in Thoreau's words, of this country's 
sponsorship of slavery and discrimination. Thoreau's metaphor is ap-
propriate, I believe, because it suggests the necessity of some form of 
atonement, or reckoning, or-in Dr. Martin Luther King's words-
redemption. 129 King's question was whether and how .L\merica was 
going to use the civil rights movement to redeem itself: it remains a 
valid question today,l3O 
128 See ROBINSON, supra note 6, at 3-6; see also Ogletree, Repairing the Past, supra note 41, 
at 282-83 (citing Robinson). 
129 Martin Luther King,Jr., Facing the Clwllenge of a New Age, ill [HAVE A DREAM: WRIT-
INGS AND SPEECHES THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 14, 22 (james l\[e1vin Washington eel., 
1992); see also Ogletree, Repairing the Past, supra note 41, at 283-84 (discussing Dr. King's 
notion of redemption). James Baldwin also employed the notion of a redemptive remak-
ing of America, counseling his nephew,James: 
[T]hese [white] men are your brothers-your lost, younger brothers. And if 
the word integmtion means anything, this is what it means: that we, with love, 
shall force our brothers to see themselves as they are, to cease fleeing from 
reality and begin to change it .... [VY]e can make America what America 
must become. 
JAMES BALDWIN, My Dungeon Shook: Letter to My Nephew Oil the Olle Hundredth AnniveJ:wry of 
the Emancipation, in THE FIRE NEXT TIME IS, 23-24 (1963). 
130 This idea of redemption is intimately related to King's idea of a "beloved commu-
nity," by which he meant "the reconstruction of a social reality based on a radically differ-
ent assessment of human potential." Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The 
Reconstructive Theology of Dr: jHartin Luther Killg, jI:, 103 HARV. L. REV. 985, 988, 1038-41 
(1990). The socially inclusive nature of this redemptive enterprise can be seen as early as 
King's leadership during the Montgomery Bus Boycott of 1955-56. Randall Kennedy sug-
gests that King "emphatically portrayed the boycott as a more ambitious and inclusive un-
dertaking [than an expression of African-American solidarity and pride]. '\Ve are not 
struggling merely for the rights of Negroes,' he declared one evening at a MV\ prayer 
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The stakes in this issue are high. To fail to acknowledge and ac-
count for America's history is to ignore and reject the past and con-
tinuing experiences of a huge segment of the population and to per-
petuate the treatment of African Americans as somehow less worthy 
or interesting than other citizens. 131 To do so is literally and meta-
phorically to split the nation, which is the defining problem for both 
Abraham Lincoln and, in a differen t way, for Malcolm X. 
Lincoln can be regarded as dealing with the moral and political 
consequences of keeping a nation whole: Malcolm X with tearing it 
apart. Lincoln's concern was to read-or rather, re-read-the Consti-
tution in a manner that remained consistent with the dual aspirations 
of national unity and the rejection-or at least, containment-of slav-
ery.132 Lincoln combined literalist and idealist readings of the Consti-
tution, first to calm southern fears that he would emancipate slaves on 
his accession to the presidency, while at the same time assuaging the 
northern abolitionist demand that slavery be contained to those states 
in which it currently existed.133 He developed his idealist reading of 
the Constitution during the Civil \Var, re-orienting the Constitution in 
light of new principles he took as fundamental to the American expe-
rience: full equality for all peo/l/e, derived from a democratic govern-
ment that is of, by, and for those people. 134 By the end of the Gettys-
meeting. "Ve are determined to make America a better place for all people.'" Randall 
Kennedy, Martin Lut!ICr King's Constitution: A Legal History of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, 98 
YALE LJ. 999, 1024 (1989) (citation omitted). 
131 See, e.g., Randall L. Kennedy. McCleskY v. Kemp: Race, CajJital Punishment, and the 
Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1417 (1988) (discussing the Supreme Court's "ra-
cially selective patterns of emotional response"). Professor Ogletree has elaborated on the 
significance of these emotional responses for reparations in two recent articles. See 
Ogletree, The Current Reparations Debate, supra note 72, at 1057; Ogletree, Repairing the Past, 
supra note 41, at 279,281-85. 
132 Lincoln was certainly far from endorsing the social equality of African Americans 
before the outbreak of the Ch'il War. Bv 1862, Lincoln still officially entertained the idea of 
relocating freed African Americans to Central America, at least as a means of giving them 
the social equality he believed they could not attain in America. See Abraham Lincoln, 
Address to a Deputation of Colored Men (Aug. 14, 1862), in CLASSICAL BLACK NATIONALISM: 
FROM TIlE AMERICAN REVOLUTION TO l\fARCUS GARVEY 209,210-11,212 (Wilson Jeremiah 
l\Ioses ed., 1996). Moreover, Congress had appropriated $600,000 for that purpose. Id. at 
209. 
133 See Treanor, supra note 122, at 1782-84. 
134 Sec id. at 1784-85. Lincoln's reference to people, rather than citizens, reflects this 
inclusiveness, neatly sidestepping (and thereby rendering irrelevant) the central reason for 
claiming that slaves have no rights, articulated in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 691, 19 
How. 393 (1856). 
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burg Address,135 Lincoln had re-orientated the nation to a new con-
cern with the shared humanity of all individuals, and: 
Equality-nowhere mentioned in our unamended Constitu-
tion-bec[a]me the fundamental commitment of the constitu-
tional order. Garry \\Tills has written that Lincoln "cleanse[d] 
the Constitution-not, as \Villiam Lloyd Garrison had, by burn-
ing an insU'ument that countenanced slavery. He altered the 
document from within, by appeal from its letter to the spirit, 
subtly changing the recalcitrant stuff of that legal compromise, 
bringing to it its own indictment."136 
By the time of the second Inaugural Address, Lincoln recognized that 
the people's task was to continue "the work we are in; to bind up the 
nation's wounds," but saw this task as intimately related to atoning as a 
nation for the wrongs of slavery.137 
For Malcolm X, the separate and lower status of African Americans 
precluded politicians, and in fact all citizens, from claiming to speak as 
representative Americans on behalf of the nation. For how can we talk 
of an America generally defined in terms of its freedom-protecting in-
stitutions when African Americans are excluded fl'om it? Famously, 
Malcolm X interrogated the consequences of continuing to deny Afri-
can A.mericans equal status, utilizing the metaphor of diners at a L:'1ble: 
"I'm not going to sit at your table and watch you eat, with nothing on 
my plate, and call myself a diner. Sitting at the table doesn't make you a 
diner, unless you eat some of what's on that plate."138 For Malcolm X, 
the perpetuation of the resentment engendered by second-class citizen-
ship led down the road to another civil war, the explosion of a racial 
135 EINHORN, supra note 122, at 177-78 (Gettysburg Address, 1862). 
136 Treanor, supra note 122, at 1784. 
137 EINHORN, supra note 122, at 180 (Second Inaugural Address, 1865). Lincoln's 
judgment that the Civil War could be regarded as divine retribution for the national sin of 
slavery is famously expressed in that speech: 
Id. 
[If] all the wealth piled by the bondsman's two hundred and fifty years of un· 
requited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash 
shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, ... so still must it be said the 
judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether. 
138 l\Ialcolm X, The Ballot or the Bullet. A.ddress Before the Cory Alethodist Church (Apr. 3, 
1964), in MALCOLM X: SELECTED SPEECHES AND STATEMENTS 26 (George Breitman ed., 
1965). 
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powder keg. 139 To continue to live under such circumstances was, 
Malcolm X believed, so destructive of all Americans' humanity that, for 
a time, he believed the only solution was separation into different na-
tions.140 Malcolm X's late turn to a focus on human rights offers hope 
that even the most ardent nationalist can recognize the possibility of 
racial reconciliation based upon respect for a common humanity in a 
transformed, "redeemed" America. 
One of the greatest challenges facing reparations activists is per-
suading the majority of Americans that a conversation on race and 
society, responsibility and redemption, is still necessary. Many African 
Americans feel the need for such a dialogue but are still unconYinced 
that asking for reparations is the best way to initiate it. My response is, 
in part, to agree: if reparations remains a confrontational demand for 
money from individual whites, then it has no chance of promoting 
anything other than a shouting match. If reparations is presented as a 
means of accounting for our responsibilities as citizens to each other 
and then acknowledging those responsibilities, perhaps by living up to 
them, then I think the reparations conversation could be both posi-
tive and fruitful. 
Is litigation the best place to start such a conversation? I do not 
think so. Litigation lends itself to the confrontational model-after 
all, that is what the bilateral structure of rights is all about. It may even 
be that the whole point about "correlativity" is to function as a device 
to weed out the types of claims that ought to be promoted through 
the legal system as opposed to those that should not. 141 Nonetheless, a 
conversation has to start somewhere, and as all jilted lovers know, 
there is never any good time nor good way in which to start a conver-
sation one does not want to hear. \Ve have tried activism, social pres-
sure, and legislation. None has proved an unqualified success. Where 
139 See Malcom X. America's Gravest Crisis Since the Civil War, in MALCOLM X: THE LAST 
SPEECHES 59, 62-63 (Bruce Perry ed., 1989). 
140 It is clear that Malcolm X thought that second-class citizenship undermined African 
Americans' humanity. I would suggest that l\lalcolm X's description of whites as "devils" 
also expressed the inherent inhumanity of those who perpetuated the systematic exclusion 
of African Americans either actively or by acquiescence. This is certainly James Baldwin's 
reading of that theology: "[O]ne did not need to prove to a Harlem audience that all white 
men were devils. They were merely glad to have, at last, divine corroboration of their ex-
perience, to hear ... that they had been lied to for all these years and generations." JAMES 
BALDWIN, Down at the Cross: Letterjroll! a Region in My lIIind, in THE FIRE NEXT TIME 25, 64 
(1963). 
141 This suggestion was made to me by Professor Kenneth l\'bck of Harvard Law 
School. It comports with Professor Hylton's argument that litigation is ineffective to pro-
mote welfare claims. See Hylton, supm note 29, at 32-36. 
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activism and legislation have failed, as in Oklahoma, then the only 
option left, it seems, is litigation. If litigation manages to start a con-
versation, even though it fails in the short term, it will have succeeded 
in the long term. The danger, of course, is that by resorting to litiga-
tion the only possible conversation is one that is somewhat forced, 
with all the resentment that engenders. 
CONCLUSION: REPARATIONS AND RECKONINGS 
Reckoning-acting on our mutual obligations to each other as 
fellow citizens and fellow humans-which I have suggested comports 
with Dr. King's notion of redemption, provides, I believe, the single 
most positive aspect of reparations: the opportunity for diverse and 
fractured comrnunities to reconstruct themselves through a forward-
looking act designed to overcome past inequity. One does not have to 
have committed a wrong to jump on that bandwagon. It situates the 
moral obligation for reparations not in a particularized claim-a duty 
owed by one individual (or his/her descendants) to another (or 
his/her descendants) on the basis of past mistreatment-but in the 
more general recognition that we all have a duty to help those who 
have suffered, that such suffering is through no fault of their own but 
rather attributable to institutional discrimination, and that the per-
petuation of such suffering diminishes us as a community. 
Thus, the "confrontationalist" argument fails because, on this 
model, something more than payment is needed. Instead, what is re-
quired is a renewed orientation towards America and Americans that 
permits what Professor Loury has called, in a recent speech, the dis-
covery of intimacy between the races: the ability of all Americans to 
think of each other as intimates. 142 
The only way that we can find out what troubles another person 
is to continue to converse with her and to respect what she says-to 
treat her as an equal. This may require making amends for some un-
intended slight that one has given the other on a previous occasion or 
acknowledging the existence of inequalities for which one is not per-
sonally responsible. To continue our national conversation, the con-
versation of how we are to be a nation at all, may require us to begin 
the process of charting on what terms we can begin conversation 
anew. I think Abraham Lincoln, Malcolm X and Dr. Martin Luther 
142 Glenn Loury, Speech at Harvard Law School Saturday School (Nov. 6, 2002) (Har-
vard Video Archive) (speaking about his book: The Anatomy of Racial Inequality), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edll/ stllden ts/ saturday-schaal/video _archive.sh tml. 
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King, each in their different ways, undertook this task. If we are truly 
to be a nation united then we need to find a way to follow their ex-
ample. Reparations, I believe, is an excellent place to start. 

